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Abstract: What affects individual investors’ willingness to invest in an asset? This paper 
presents evidence that — when there is no salient reference purchase price — investors tend to 
be return chasers and variance avoiders with respect to their idiosyncratic history with the asset. 
Using administrative panel data on 25,000 401(k) accounts at five firms, we find that an 
investor’s 401(k) contribution rate increases more if she has recently experienced a higher 401(k) 
portfolio return and/or a lower 401(k) return variance. We find no evidence that this behavior is 
welfare-improving. These results are explained by a naïve reinforcement learning heuristic: 
investors expect that investments in which they experienced past success will be successful in the 
future, whether or not such a belief is logically justified. Consistent with reinforcement 
learning’s Power Law of Practice, return chasing and variance avoidance diminish with age.  
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What affects individual investors’ willingness to invest in an asset? A large literature on 
the “disposition effect” has shown that their idiosyncratic history with that asset plays a 
significant role. Investors are reluctant to sell assets that have fallen below their purchase price 
and more likely to sell assets that have risen above their purchase price.
1 This behavior is 
anomalous because the asset’s purchase price is investor-specific and already sunk, and hence 
should not affect the selling decision in the absence of capital gains taxes.
2 Odean (1998) shows 
that investors are also more likely to buy additional shares of stocks they already own if they 
have unrealized losses in those stocks. The most common explanation for the disposition effect is 
that prospect theory preferences (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) cause investors to experience 
disutility from making a sale below the “reference price” at which they bought the asset, and to 
be risk-seeking for assets that are mentally classified in the loss domain.
3 
In this paper, we study how idiosyncratic history matters when there is no salient 
reference purchase price. Such situations commonly arise when periodic asset purchases are 
automatically made for an investor over time. This causes the investor’s holdings to have many 
different purchase prices for each asset, and purchases usually have occurred without the 
investor’s direct oversight. Therefore, it is difficult for the investor to mentally establish a single 
reference price below which his investment is in the loss domain. Automatic purchases occur 
most frequently in employer-sponsored 401(k) plans
4—the setting we focus on—which divert a 
pre-specified proportion of each paycheck to invest in the plan assets until the employee elects 
                                                 
1 The seminal papers are Shefrin and Statman (1985) and Odean (1998). The disposition effect has since been 
documented by many other researchers, including Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Shapira and Venezia (2001), 
Genesove and Mayer (2001), Wermers (2003), Coval and Shumway (2005), Locke and Mann (2005), and Dhar and 
Zhu (2006).  
2 Introducing capital gains taxes should make investors more prone to sell losers (Constantinides, 1984), which is the 
opposite of what they actually do. 
3 See, however, Barberis and Xiong (2006) for an argument that prospect theory does not robustly produce the 
disposition effect.  
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otherwise or leaves the firm. Many mutual fund companies also allow investors to set up a 
recurring transfer from their bank account to the fund company to buy fund shares.  
Using administrative panel data on approximately 25,000 individual 401(k) accounts at 
five companies, we find that in the absence of a salient reference price, investors act as return 
chasers and variance avoiders with respect to their idiosyncratic 401(k) returns history. A one 
standard deviation increase in an investor’s rate of return in her overall 401(k) portfolio relative 
to her coworkers during year t increases the change in her 401(k) contribution rate between year-
ends t – 1 and t by 0.13 percentage points of income. Conversely, a one standard deviation 
increase in the variance of an investor’s 401(k) return relative to her coworkers during year t 
lowers her (cumulative) contribution rate change between year-ends t – 1 and t + 1 by 0.35 
percentage points. These effects are economically significant. By comparison, the average annual 
contribution rate change in our sample is 0.30 percentage points.  
Our empirical methodology allows us to rule out many rational explanations for the 
return chasing and variance avoidance we observe. Because we include individual fixed effects 
in our regressions, we control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity that drives differential 
average 401(k) contribution rate changes. Because we include company × year fixed effects, we 
hold constant public news about expected returns for the plan’s investment options. Essentially, 
we are comparing contemporaneous contribution rate changes across individuals within the same 
401(k) plan. Investor A should not believe the mutual funds in the 401(k) investment menu have 
a different expected return distribution than her coworker, Investor B, does simply because A’s 
chosen investments in the plan outperformed B’s chosen investments in the plan. Our results are 
also robust to controlling for wealth effects and year-specific shocks that are correlated with an 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 At year-end 2005, 401(k) plans in aggregate held $2.4 trillion of retirement savings owned by 47 million 
individuals (Holden and VanDerhei, 2006).   
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individual’s absolute (dollar) and relative (percent) 401(k) allocations to equities, bonds, and 
cash at year-end t – 1. 
We investigate the possibility that return chasing and variance avoidance are the result of 
investors rationally learning about their skill at asset allocation within the 401(k). If an investor 
can infer from her high realized performance that she has 401(k) asset allocation skill, she could 
reasonably decide to increase her 401(k) contributions on that basis. But contrary to the rational 
learning hypothesis, we find no evidence that high past 401(k) alphas predict high future 401(k) 
alphas. If anything, a high alpha in the current year predicts a low alpha in the following year. 
Our findings are explained by a naïve reinforcement learning heuristic: investors expect 
that investments in which they personally experienced past success will be successful in the 
future, whether or not such a belief is logically justified. A key feature of reinforcement learning 
models is the Power Law of Practice: learning curves are steep initially and then level out as the 
stock of reinforcements increases and each additional stimulus constitutes a smaller proportional 
addition to the stock (Roth and Erev, 1995). Consistent with the Power Law of Practice, we find 
that both return chasing and variance avoidance diminish with age. Nevertheless, our point 
estimates indicate that investors continue to follow these heuristics into their sixties. 
The return chasing we observe contrasts sharply with the contrarian behavior associated 
with the disposition effect, where investors are prone to keep or increase their holdings of losers. 
The two phenomena can be reconciled by decomposing idiosyncratic history effects into a belief-
based component and a preference-based component. Past return performance positively affects 
estimates of future return performance through reinforcement learning. In the absence of a 
reference price, these beliefs induce return chasing and variance avoidance. However, once a 
reference price becomes salient, the loss aversion induced by prospect theory preferences is  
5 
activated and dominates the reinforcement learning effect, leading to reluctance to close out 
losing positions and a propensity to increase risk-taking in those securities.
5 
Our results complement Barber, Odean, and Strahilevetz (2004), who document 
brokerage investors’ propensity to repurchase individual stocks they previously sold for a gain 
while shunning individual stocks they previously sold for a loss. Barber, Odean and Strahilevetz 
find that purchased stocks previously sold for a gain do not subsequently underperform relative 
to benchmarks based on size and book-to-market. Therefore, conditional on making a purchase, 
the propensity to buy previously profitable stocks appears to be welfare-neutral. In our setting, 
however, welfare will generally be affected by changes in an employee’s 401(k) contributions, 
which are tax-advantaged and often garner a matching employer contribution.  
Our paper is also related to the large literature finding that investors chase mutual fund 
returns.
6 Because these other papers identify return chasing using variation in mutual fund 
returns, it is difficult for them to tell whether return chasing is motivated by rational updating on 
truly useful information embedded in fund returns, or if investors are blindly chasing returns per 
se.
7 We identify return chasing holding fixed mutual fund returns and using variation in returns 
                                                 
5 One might suspect that we are not finding contrarian behavior simply because 401(k) investments are mostly in 
mutual funds rather than individual stocks, not because there is no salient reference purchase price. However, 
Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2000) document the disposition effect in brokerage account mutual fund holdings. Such 
holdings are much more likely to have a salient reference purchase price, since they were probably not accumulated 
through an automatic purchase plan. 
6 This literature includes Ippolito (1992), Goetzmann and Peles (1993), Patel, Zeckhauser, and Hendricks (1994), 
Sirri and Tufano (1998), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), and Goetzmann and Massa (2002). 
7 The rationality of mutual fund returns-chasing has been widely debated. Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999) find that 
returns-chasing is profitable, whereas Frazzini and Lamont (2006) come to the opposite conclusion. Sapp and Tiwari 
(2004) conclude that any profitability from individuals’ returns-chasing can be explained by the stock momentum 
effect (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). Empirical studies of mutual fund performance persistence that do not 
specifically examine retail flows include Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1996), and Carhart 
(1997). Berk and Green (2004) argue that returns-chasing without mutual fund performance persistence is to be 
expected when rational investors delegate funds to portfolio managers with diminishing returns to scale in security 
selection. In their model, money flows to a manager who has demonstrated stock-picking skill until the manager can 
no longer deliver superior returns going forward. Such diminishing returns, however, can not explain the key finding 
of our analysis: 401(k) investors are more prone to chase returns that they have personally experienced, rather than 
those they have observed but not experienced.   
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investors have personally experienced in their 401(k).
8 If a naïve reinforcement learning 
heuristic causes 401(k) investors to become more willing to hold 401(k) assets when their 401(k) 
has idiosyncratically performed well, then similarly naïve motivations may drive the higher 
willingness to hold mutual funds that have recently performed well. 
Finally, our paper adds to a small but growing empirical literature on investor learning. 
Other papers have studied how learning improves investing skill, as manifested in higher 
portfolio returns or decreasing strength of the disposition effect (Nicolosi, Peng, and Zhu, 2004; 
Feng and Seasholes, 2005; Seru, Shumway, and Stoffman, 2006). In contrast, our paper focuses 
on how investors update their portfolios in response to irrelevant information, although we do 
find that this responsiveness attenuates with experience  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes our 401(k) data. Although 
ours is the first study to use these specific records, other papers have exploited different sets of 
individual-level 401(k) data to study savings rates (Huberman, Iyengar, and Jiang, 2006), asset 
allocation (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sundén, 2003; Huberman and 
Jiang, 2006), trading (Choi, Laibson, and Metrick, 2002; Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sundén, 2003), 
and investment in employer stock (Huberman and Sengmueller, 2004; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, 
and Metrick, 2004). Section II explains the framework within which we conduct our empirical 
estimation. Section III presents our results, and Section IV considers alternative interpretations of 
the results. Section V concludes. 
 
                                                 
8 To our knowledge, the only other paper that uses a similar identification method is Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini 
(2007), who document that within a given time period, Swedish investors are more likely to stop holding risky assets 
altogether after experiencing poor mutual fund returns. The authors are primarily concerned with rebalancing 
behavior and do not connect poor portfolio performance with anything other than overall risky asset participation 
status.  
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I. Data description 
  Our data come from a large benefits record-keeping firm. We have panel data for five 
companies that start when our data provider became the plan administrator at each company and 
end at year-end 2000. These data contain the date, amount, and type of every transaction made in 
these firms’ 401(k) plans by every participant. In addition, we have year-end cross-sectional 
snapshots from 1998, 1999, and 2000 for all active employees that include demographic 
information such as birth date, hire date, gender, compensation, marital status, and state of 
residence (e.g. California). The year-end cross-sections also contain point-in-time 401(k) 
information, including the contribution rate in effect during the final pay period of the year, total 
balances, and asset allocations. 
Table I gives summary statistics as of year-end 2000 for our companies, which we code-
name Company A through E. Our sample consists of large firms that span a wide range of 
industries. Equally weighting each company, the employees are on average 42.9 years old and 
earn $55,292 a year. By comparison, the March 2001 Current Population Survey reports an 
average age of 40.8 years and average salary of $45,656 among full-time workers in companies 
employing over 1,000 workers and offering some kind of retirement plan. The average 401(k) 
participation rate across the firms is 79%, which is close to the 2000 national participation rate of 
80% found by the Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America (2001), and the average balance of 
participants is $65,964, which is similar to Holden and VanDerhei’s (2001) reported average 
year-end 2000 balance of $61,207 among plans with more than 10,000 participants. 
  At each of these firms, employees can choose a contribution rate that is an integer 
percentage of their salary. The contribution rate determines how much of each paycheck is 
deducted and contributed to the plan, and it remains in effect until the employee actively changes  
8 
it. All of our companies offer matching contributions proportional to employee contributions up 
to a threshold, although Company C did not introduce its match until 2000. For example, 
employees who contributed at least 3% of their pay at Company B received an additional 
contribution from the company equal to 0.75% their pay. 
  The large majority of the plans’ investment options are mutual funds. Every plan offers at 
least eight mutual funds, including at least one fixed-income fund. The most important 
investment option that is not a mutual fund is employer stock, which is offered by four of our 
five plans. In addition, Companies A and D added a self-directed window to their plans in 2000 
and 1999, respectively. Self-directed windows allow participants to buy and sell individual 
stocks using their 401(k) balances. We do not observe transactions within the self-directed 
windows, although we do know the total balances held in the windows at each year-end. Among 
plan participants in Companies A and D, 1.1% and 8.0%, respectively, had any balances in the 
self-directed window at year-end 2000. Conditional upon having any money in the window, 
participants in Companies A and D held on average 34.1% and 28.1% of their 401(k) balances in 
the window, respectively. 
All of the plans allow participants to take hardship withdrawals from and loans against 
their 401(k) plan balances, and only one does not allow non-hardship withdrawals. These 
provisions make 401(k) savings in the companies we study more liquid than for the typical 
401(k) participant at the time.
9 All of the plans allow changes to the elected contribution rate and 
asset allocation on a daily basis. Changes can be made by talking to a benefits center 
representative on the phone during business hours, or by using a touch-tone phone system or the 
                                                 
9 The U.S. Department of Labor (2003) reports that in 2000, 40% of full-time employees with savings and thrift 
plans in private industry were not allowed to take early in-service withdrawals for any reason, and an additional 29% 
could only take hardship withdrawals. The Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America (2001) reports that 14% of 
plans did not permit loans in 2000.  
9 
Internet 24 hours a day. The direct transaction cost of changing one’s contribution rate in these 
plans is therefore minimal. 
 
II. Empirical methodology 
Our empirical objective is to estimate the relationship between changes in an individual’s 
401(k) contribution rate and the first two moments of 401(k) returns. We define the one-year 
401(k) rate of return, R, as the sum of the monthly percent returns of the 401(k) over a one-year 
period. More formally, let i index investors, f index 401(k) investment funds, t index years, and 
m index months within a year. Then 
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where wi,f,t,m is the fraction of i’s 401(k) portfolio held in fund f at the beginning of the mth 
month of year t, and rf,t,m is the return of fund f during the mth month of year t. We define σ
2(Ri,t) 
as the annualized variance of the twelve monthly returns that comprise Ri,t. 
  We adopt a flexible functional form for the determinants of an individual’s 401(k) 
contribution rate. Let Ci,t be the 401(k) contribution rate, measured as a percent of salary, in 
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where gi(·) is a function specific to investor i, agei,t is the investor’s age, Xi,t is a vector of other 
control variables defined as of year-end t, and εi,t is the residual term.
11 The function gi could 
                                                 
10 By using the instantaneous contribution rate at year-end rather than the total contributions during the year, we can 
be sure that all the information in the explanatory variables was potentially available to the investor before she made 
her choice of the dependent variable. 
11 We could also model the contribution rate change as a function of the level of R and other controls. We continue 
to find significant returns-chasing under this alternative specification. We prefer the specification in the main text  
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vary across investors due to unobserved differences (e.g. discount rates, risk aversion, expected 
income growth, background risk) that alter the optimal solution to the lifecycle consumption-
investment problem. By controlling for g, we control for year-over-year contribution changes 
that would have occurred due to lifecycle considerations, regardless of 401(k) returns. We 
include contemporaneous returns Ri,t and their variance σ
2(Ri,t). We also include lagged returns 
and the variance of lagged returns, Ri,t–1 and σ
2(Ri,t–1), to allow for the possibility of a sluggish 
response to 401(k) performance.  
We assume that the function gi(agei,t) is locally well-approximated by a first-order Taylor 
expansion around the investor’s age at year-end 1999 (the middle year in our sample of 
contribution rates): 
  , ,1999 , ,1999 ()( )( )
2
i
ii t ii i t i g age g age age age
α
≈+ − . (3) 
Substituting (3) into (2) and first-differencing yields an equation with an individual fixed 
effect in contribution rate changes: 
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We estimate (4) using least-squares regression, first-differencing the equation to eliminate the 
individual fixed effect. Hence, the dependent variable is ultimately the second-difference of Ci,t, 
or the change in contribution rate changes. Note that because we have only three years of 
contribution rate data, there is only one second-differenced C observation per person. We cluster 
our standard errors at the company × state level in case peer effects or information spillovers 
                                                                                                                                                             
because making the contribution rate change a function of the return level allows the contribution rate level to drift 
without bound in theory.  
11 
cause dependence in contribution rate changes between coworkers in the same office (Duflo and 
Saez, 2003; Hong, Kubik, and Stein, 2004; Ivkovich and Weisbenner, 2007).
12 
The presence of the individual fixed effect imposes the requirement that all employees in 
our regressions have two contribution rate change observations. We also need four full years of 
capital gains data in order to estimate the coefficients on both contemporaneous and lagged ∆R. 
Thus, our sample is limited to workers who have been actively employed at a sample firm and 
continuously enrolled in the 401(k) plan from January 1, 1997 to December 31, 2000. Company 
E’s data start on March 31, 1997, when our data provider assumed administrative services for its 
plan, so we instead require its workers to be actively employed and continuously enrolled in the 
plan from March 31, 1997 to December 31, 2000.
13 
Contributions to 401(k) plans are usually made with before-tax money. However, some 
of our sample plans allow contributions using after-tax money as well. We add the before-tax 
and (if the plan offers the option) after-tax 401(k) contribution rates in effect for the last pay 
period of 1998, 1999, or 2000 to calculate Ci,t in each of these years. We include employees 
whose contribution rate is zero, provided that they had a positive contribution rate or balance at 
some time in the past.
14 We also require that individuals have salaries greater than $20,000 in 
1998 because a large fraction of those with salaries under $20,000 are part-time employees who 
are likely to direct less attention to the 401(k) than full-time employees.
15 In addition, we trim 
workers who have a one-year income growth observation greater than 30% or less than –20%, 
                                                 
12 Consistent with there being only weak geographic effects in contribution rates, our standard errors are barely 
affected by clustering relative to assuming that all observations are independent. In contrast, the standard errors in 
our portfolio return persistence analysis, presented in Section V.A, are greatly increased by clustering. 
13 We assign a zero 401(k) return to Company E employees for the first three months of 1997. Our results are 
qualitatively similar if we drop Company E from the sample. 
14 Employees with no balances in the plan are excluded from our analysis because our key explanatory variable, the 
individual’s rate of return on plan assets, is only defined for those with assets in the plan.  
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which roughly corresponds to removing the top 2% and bottom 2% of the income growth 
distribution. These deleted outliers are likely caused by transitions between part-time and full-
time work status. 
Finally, we drop individuals if their 1998 salary is high enough that, by contributing at 
the plan’s maximum before-tax contribution rate, they could exceed the $10,000 statutory limit 
on 1998 before-tax 401(k) contributions. The reason we impose this selection rule is that a highly 
paid employee could contribute enough that he hits the before-tax dollar limit midway through 
the year. For the rest of the year, his before-tax contribution rate is frozen at 0 and does not 
reflect any desired change.
16 
All of our specifications include the log of the employee’s tenure at the company and 
company dummies interacted with year dummies in the Xi,t vector. The company × year 
dummies control for public news about future asset returns that affect optimal contribution rates, 
as well as news that is specifically relevant to employees of each company.
17 In many 
specifications, we also control for wealth effects by adding contemporaneous and lagged 401(k) 
capital gains normalized by current income, CapitalGaini,t/Yi,t and CapitalGaini,t–1/Yi,t, where 
CapitalGaini,t is investor i’s 401(k) dollar capital gain during year t and Yi,t is the investor’s 
annual salary. We calculate CapitalGaini,t by taking the difference in balances between year-end 
t and t – 1 and then subtracting contributions, rollovers into the plan, and loan repayments during 
year t and adding back withdrawals and new loans during year t. We normalize CapitalGain (a 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 In the March 2001 Current Population Survey, 29.9% of workers who earned less than $20,000 a year worked less 
than 35 hours a week or fewer than 40 weeks per year. Only 5.6% of workers earning between $20,000 and $30,000 
a year satisfied this definition of part-time work. 
16 We also drop a small number of Company A employees who are eligible to contribute to the company’s deferred 
compensation plan. 
17 The company × year dummies reduce to a single company dummy in the final double-differenced equation (4).  
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variable whose unit is dollars) by income because the dependent variable in our regressions 
(contribution rate) is also expressed as a percent of income.  
Unfortunately, we cannot calculate portfolio returns, R, including returns in the self-
directed windows at Companies A and D, since we do not observe monthly window balances. 
The two capital gains variables, however, do include dollar gains realized in the window. Our 
contribution change results are robust to excluding Companies A and D from the sample.  
 
III. Results 
A. Summary statistics 
The selection criteria described in Section II leave us with 49,248 contribution rate 
change observations on 24,624 employees. Table II reports summary statistics for contribution 
rate changes and our portfolio return variables. From 1998 to 2000, the median annual 
contribution rate change is zero, and the mean change is 0.30 percentage points of income. 
Between 1998 and 1999, 20.6% of our sample investors changed their contribution rate, and 
22.4% changed their contribution rate between 1999 and 2000 (these specific numbers are not 
reported in the table). Over the two years, 35.1% of investors made at least one contribution rate 
change. 
Pooled across 1997 to 2000, the one-year 401(k) rate of return, R, has a median of 9.9% 
and a mean of 11.9%. Reflecting the dramatic late-1990s bull market and subsequent crash, R 
has a wide distribution; its pooled cross-sectional standard deviation is 16.9%. The volatility of 
portfolio returns, σ
2(R), also exhibits wide variation across individuals due to differing portfolio 
shares allocated to equities and particularly to employer stock. The typical volatility is quite 
high, since many plan participants held significant amounts of their employer’s stock. Our  
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companies’ monthly stock returns generally experienced annualized standard deviations well 
over 100% during the sample period. The dollar capital gain normalized by income, 
CapitalGain/Y, has an economically narrower range because most investors’ 401(k) balances are 
modest compared to their income. The mean and median of CapitalGain/Y are 0.04 and 0.09, 
respectively, and its standard deviation is 0.30.  
The extreme two percentiles of R and CapitalGain/Y contain especially large positive and 
negative returns. The minimum and maximum values of R are –82.6% and 127.6%, and the 
corresponding values for CapitalGain/Y are –8.49 and 7.87. The R outliers are due to an OTC 
fund, a technology fund, two growth funds, two international funds, and one company’s stock; 
the CapitalGain/Y outliers are investors with large 401(k) balances who invested in funds with 
extreme returns. The estimates that we report below are not driven by these outliers. We have re-
run our regressions trimming the extreme two percentiles of R, σ
2(R), or CapitalGain/Y and find 
that our results are nearly unchanged. 
 
B. Main contribution rate change regressions 
  Table III presents the coefficients from estimating equation (4). The first column shows 
estimates from the baseline specification, which includes first-differenced contemporaneous and 
lagged 401(k) return and volatility, log tenure, and company-year dummies as explanatory 
variables. We find that a one standard deviation increase in year t return causes the change in the 
401(k) contribution rate between year-ends t – 1 and t to rise by 16.87 × 0.0078 = 0.13 
percentage points of income, an effect that is significant at the 1% level. There is no effect in 
year t + 1.  
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In contrast, a one standard deviation increase in year t volatility causes the change in the 
contribution rate between year-ends t – 1 and t to fall by 6,307/1000 × 0.029 = 0.18 percentage 
points in year t. The contribution rate change continues to fall an additional 0.17 percentage 
points between year-ends t and t + 1. Both the contemporaneous and lagged variance-avoidance 
effects are significant at the 1% level. 
To assess the economic significance of these effects, recall that the average annual 
contribution rate increase is 0.30 percentage points of income. Thus, the 0.13 percentage point 
effect of 401(k) returns and the 0.35 percentage point two-year effect of volatility are substantial 
relative to the mean. 
Because we are including company × year dummies in our regression, we are controlling 
for public news about expected asset returns and news specifically relevant to employees of each 
company. Holding fixed news, an investor should not update his beliefs about the future returns 
of his 401(k)’s investment options differently based upon the fact that his portfolio did better or 
worse than his coworkers’ portfolio over the same time period. Yet we find that employees do 
invest more in their 401(k) when their portfolio performance was better than their coworkers’. 
Because we are including individual fixed effects in our regression, we are also controlling for 
sources of time-invariant investor heterogeneity—such as risk aversion, time preference, human 
capital, etc.—that may affect changes in contribution rates. 
Even after controlling for time shocks common to each company, one might worry that 
there is cross-sectional heterogeneity in the time shock that is correlated with 401(k) portfolio 
returns. One candidate for such a correlated shock is the wealth effect from the 401(k) portfolio 
capital gain itself. However, the second column of Table III shows that controlling for the  
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contemporaneous and lagged normalized dollar capital gains in the 401(k) barely affects the 
coefficients on return and volatility. 
Another potential concern is that a series of economic news arrived during our sample 
period that differentially affected the type of people who tend to hold relatively more equities 
(e.g. news about the return to high-skill human capital). Because asset class allocations are in 
turn correlated with portfolio returns, this could confound our identification. To account for this 
possibility, the third column of Table III adds interactions between year dummies and three 
variables: the dollar amount of the individual’s portfolio held in equities, bonds, and cash, all as 
a fraction of income at the prior year-end. In the last column of Table III we also add interactions 
between year dummies and two variables: the fraction of one’s 401(k) allocated to equities and to 
bonds (also at the prior year-end). Even with these additional controls, we continue to estimate 
large and statistically significant return chasing and variance avoidance, and the point estimates 
remain similar to those in the baseline specification of column 1. In the most comprehensive 
specification, we find that a one standard deviation increase in portfolio returns in year t 
increases the 401(k) contribution rate change in year t by 0.12 percentage points, and a one 
standard deviation increase in the volatility of returns in year t decreases the 401(k) contribution 
rate change by 0.16 percentage points in year t and 0.17 percentage points in year t + 1. 
These findings are consistent with individual investors following a naïve reinforcement 
learning heuristic: investors expect that investments in which they personally experienced past 
rewards will be rewarding in the future, whether or not such a belief is logically justified. 
Reinforcement learning models have had success in predicting subject choices in experiments 
(Roth and Erev, 1995; Erev and Roth, 1998). Reinforcement learning is often a sensible heuristic 
because future rewards are positively correlated with recent rewards in many domains. Financial  
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markets are a rare exception. Charness and Levin (2003) show that when an (optimal) Bayesian 
updating rule conflicts with a reinforcement learning rule, experimental subjects’ choices shift 
towards the erroneous option that reinforcement learning recommends. 
 
C. Interactions with age and salary 
A key feature of reinforcement learning models is the Power Law of Practice: learning 
curves are steep initially and then level out as the stock of reinforcements increases and each 
additional stimulus constitutes a smaller proportional addition to the stock (Roth and Erev, 
1995). Reinforcement learning therefore predicts that the contribution rate of young investors is 
more responsive to idiosyncratic portfolio performance than that of old investors. 
The regression in the first column of Table IV tests this prediction by interacting 
contemporaneous and lagged change in 401(k) return and volatility, ∆R and ∆σ
2(R), with de-
meaned investor age at year-end 1998. For brevity, we show only the most comprehensive 
regression specification that controls for contemporaneous and lagged normalized CapitalGain, 
asset class balance × year dummies, and asset class portfolio share × year dummies. We indeed 
find that both return chasing and variance avoidance attenuate with age. The age interaction with 
the contemporaneous change in 401(k) return is only significant at the 10% level (p = 0.09). 
However, simply removing the statistically and economically insignificant age interaction with 
the lagged change in returns from the regression causes the age interaction with 
contemporaneous returns to become significant at the 1% level while retaining the same point 
estimate. We have greater statistical power for the age interactions with contemporaneous and 
lagged volatility changes, which are both significant at the 1% level and of similar magnitudes.  
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Even though responsiveness to idiosyncratic portfolio returns decreases with age, 
investors nonetheless exhibit reinforcement learning behavior for most of their lives. The point 
estimates indicate that return chasing continues until age 68.
18 Variance avoidance diminishes 
more swiftly, but both contemporaneous and lagged variance-avoidance persists through age 54. 
One might suspect that higher-income investors would be less prone to naïve 
reinforcement learning, since income is a proxy for financial sophistication. The second column 
of Table IV examines whether this is the case by interacting contemporaneous and lagged 401(k) 
return change and volatility change with 1998 log salary. Surprisingly, income has no significant 
attenuating effect on reinforcement learning tendencies, at least within the low-to-moderate 
income investor population in our regressions. 
The final column of Table IV interacts return changes and with both age and log income. 
We see that the conclusions drawn from the first two columns are robust to allowing this 
simultaneous interaction. Age continues to attenuate the force of reinforcement learning, whereas 
income does not, and the point estimates of the interactions are nearly identical to those in the 
first two columns. 
 
IV. Alternative explanations 
  We now consider alternative mechanisms that could generate the return-chasing and 
variance-avoidance results presented above. 
 
                                                 
18 Age is de-meaned in the Table 4 to facilitate interpretation of the uninteracted ∆R and ∆σ
2(R) coefficients. The 
mean age at year-end 1998 in the regression sample is 43.4. Therefore, return chasing drops to zero at age 43.4 + 
0.0059/0.0024 × 10 = 68.0 in column 1.  
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A. Learning about investing skill 
Investors who experience high 401(k) returns with low variance may be learning that 
they have greater skill at 401(k) asset allocation than their coworkers who experience low 401(k) 
returns with high variance. Therefore, it may be rational for investors with better performance to 
allocate more to their 401(k).
19 
  If a high 401(k) return is a sign of high 401(k) investing skill, then we should see 
persistence in 401(k) portfolio returns over time. We test whether past 401(k) portfolio 
performance predicts future portfolio performance by regressing an investor’s portfolio alpha in 
year t on her portfolio alpha in year t – 1, where t = 1998, 1999, and 2000. Three-factor alphas 
are calculated by regressing monthly excess portfolio returns on the excess market return and the 
Fama and French (1993) size factor and book-to-market factor returns. Four-factor alpha 
regressions also include Kenneth French’s momentum factor (Mom) returns. We cluster our 
regression standard errors by company × year × employee state of residence to account for the 
fact that asset allocations (and hence alphas) in our sample may not be independently chosen 
within a company locality. Investors’ asset allocations are constrained by the investment options 
offered in their company’s 401(k) plan, so it may be sensible to only compare performance 
relative to other investors in the same company. Therefore, we also have specifications that 
include company × year dummies as explanatory variables.  
Table V shows the results of these portfolio performance persistence regressions. We see 
that, if anything, a good 401(k) portfolio performance this year predicts poor performance the 
                                                 
19 Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2007) find that investors stop holding both stocks and bonds after realizing poor 
mutual fund performance. Because Companies A and E do not offer cash as a 401(k) investment option, one may 
worry that our performance-chasing results are caused by investors reducing their 401(k) contributions because they 
simply want to reduce their risky asset share, rather than because they are shying away from 401(k) investing per se. 
However, our performance-chasing results are robust to restricting the sample to Companies B, C, and D, which 
offer cash funds in their 401(k).   
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following year. When we do not control for company × year effects, 100 basis points of out-
performance in year t – 1 is associated with 42 basis points of under-performance in year t using 
three-factor alphas, and 11 basis points of underperformance in year t using four-factor alphas. 
These effects attenuate when we introduce company × year dummies in the regression. Three-
factor alphas are still negatively serially correlated, while the four-factor alpha exhibits positive 
serial correlation that is both statistically and economically insignificant. The point estimate 
indicates that 100 basis points of four-factor alpha are associated with only 2 basis points of four-
factor alpha the following year.
20 
Therefore, there appears to be no empirical support for the hypothesis that returns-
chasing and variance-avoidance is driven by rational learning about one’s own investing skill. 
 
B. Rebalancing 
There is another potential alternative explanation for our finding that 401(k) contribution 
changes are positively related to portfolio returns: if an investor has significant non-401(k) 
financial assets, then a positive correlation between 401(k) and non-401(k) asset returns could 
produce the appearance of return chasing due to rebalancing. For example, suppose all 
households followed a rule of maintaining a fixed dollar amount in non-401(k) assets (a buffer 
stock). Then a high 401(k) return would be associated with a high non-401(k) return, which 
would cause high-return households to increase 401(k) contributions and increase consumption 
out of non-401(k) assets to bring non-401(k) asset values back down to baseline. 
                                                 
20 The significantly positive constant in the 4-factor alpha regression without company × year dummies mostly 
reflects the fact that our sample companies’ stocks did extraordinarily well through much of the sample period, and 
their employees often held significant amounts of those stocks. See Benartzi (2001) for evidence that rank-and-file 
employees do not have the ability to predict their employer’s stock return.   
21 
This story, however, is inconsistent with some of our other findings. Such a rebalancing 
effect should diminish as non-401(k) financial assets get smaller, since the fraction of income 
required to restore the non-401(k) balance to its steady-state level diminishes for a given percent 
return. Therefore, the rebalancing story predicts that apparent return chasing would be weakest 
among the young, who have few financial assets, and strongest among the old. The results 
presented above in Section III.C, however, showed that the empirical pattern is exactly the 
opposite: return chasing decreases with age. 
Furthermore, most 401(k) households have minimal liquid wealth outside of their 401(k) 
with which to engage in rebalancing. In the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, among 401(k)-
holding households earning between $20,000 and $70,000 a year—a sample roughly comparable 
to the one we use in our analysis—the median household has gross non-retirement financial 
assets equal to only 2.1 months of income, 76% of which is held in checking, savings, or money 
market accounts.
21 It is only at the 82nd percentile that households have one year’s income in 
gross non-retirement financial assets. These figures probably overstate outside asset holdings in 
our sample because the generosity of our 401(k) plans’ early withdrawal and loan provisions 
substantially mitigates the need for a precautionary wealth stock outside the 401(k). 
Finally, the rebalancing channel cannot explain the robust variance-avoidance we observe 
among our investors. 
 
V. Conclusion 
We have presented evidence that when there is no salient reference purchase price, 
individual investors chase their own historical returns and shy away from their own historical 
                                                 
21 We count CDs, bonds, savings bonds, publicly traded stock, mutual funds, cash value life insurance, other 
managed accounts, transactions accounts, and miscellaneous assets as non-retirement financial assets.  
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return variance. Specifically, we find that investors who experience high returns or low variance 
in their 401(k) portfolio increase their 401(k) contributions more than workers in the same 
savings plan who experience low returns and/or high variance. This behavior cannot be 
accounted for by public news about asset returns, investor fixed effects, wealth effects, or time 
shocks that are correlated with the tendency to hold equities, bonds, or cash. Moreover, we find 
no evidence that the return chasing and volatility flight are welfare improving, since 401(k) 
portfolio performance is not persistent. These results are in sharp contrast to the disposition 
effect, which induces contrarian behavior when there is a salient reference purchase price. 
The observed patterns are explained by a naïve reinforcement learning heuristic: assets in 
which one has personally experienced success are expected to be successful in the future. 
Consistent with reinforcement learning, we also find evidence for the Power Law of Practice: 
return chasing and volatility avoidance decline with age as a large stock of experience is 
accumulated, though they remain present throughout the lifecycle.   
23 
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Characteristic Company  A  Company B  Company C  Company D  Company E 
Industry Manufacturing  Healthcare  Manufacturing Utility  Electronics 
Number of employees  Over 20,000  Over 50,000  Over 20,000  Over 10,000  Over 10,000 
Average  age  44.1  42.7 44.6 43.5 39.5 
Average  salary  $51,835  $33,156 $66,700 $70,069 $54,702 
% male  80%  19%  Data unavailable  83%  65% 
%  married    56%  55% 75% Data  unavailable  50% 
401(k)  participation  rate  80%  61% 86% 85% 83% 
Average  401(k)  balance  $80,740  $19,501 $81,122 $88,033 $60,426 
Maximum contribution rate  
(% of salary) 
10% before-tax, 14% after-
tax, 14% combined 
15% before-tax  20% before-tax  25% before-tax and after-
tax combined 
1998-99: 14% before-tax
2000: 16% before-tax 
Employer match  25% to 100% (varies by 
location) of first 6% of pay 
25% of first 3%  
of pay 
None until 2000, then  
100% of first 1% of pay, 
50% of next 4% of pay 
50% of first 7% or 8% of 
pay (depends on union 
membership) 
100% of first 3% of pay, 
50% of next 3% of pay 
Investment funds  1998: 3 bond, 3 large-cap, 
1 mid-cap, 1 small-cap, 3 
overseas, company stock. 
1999: Added 1 bond, 1 
large-cap, 1 overseas. 
2000: Added 1 overseas 
and self-directed window. 
1 cash, 1 bond, 3 pre-
mix, 2 large-cap, 1 
small-cap, 1 overseas, 
company stock 
1 cash, 3 bond, 4 pre-
mix, 8 large-cap, 5 mid-
cap, 3 small-cap, 8 
overseas, 3 sector, 
company stock 
1998: 1 cash, 1 bond, 3 
pre-mix, 1 large-cap, 1 
mid-cap, 1 overseas, 
company stock 
1999: Added 1 small cap, 
self-directed window 
1 bond, 3 pre-mix, 5 
large-cap, 1 small-cap, 1 
overseas 
Number of outstanding  
loans allowed 
1 home loan, 1 general 
purpose loan 
1 2 2 2 
Hardship withdrawals   Allowed  Allowed  Allowed  Allowed  Allowed 
Non-hardship withdrawal 
rules before age 59½ 
1 withdrawal allowed per 
month from after-tax, 
rollover, vested company 
match, and profit-share 
balances  
After-tax and vested 
employer contribution 
money from 
grandfathered plans can 
be withdrawn at any time
Not allowed  After-tax and vested 
employer match money 
can be withdrawn at any 
time 
After-tax and rollover 
balances can be 
withdrawn at any time Table II. Regression Sample Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics on year-over-year change in the contribution rate effective 
during the last pay cycle of December (∆C), annual 401(k) percent return (R), annualized 401(k) return 
variance (σ
2(R)), and annual 401(k) dollar capital gains normalized by annual income (CapitalGain/Y) 
for the regression sample. The contribution rate change statistics are from year-end 1998 through year-
end 2000. The 401(k) return, 401(k) return variance, and normalized capital gains statistics are from 
year-end 1997 through year-end 2000. Capital gains from 1998 to 2000 are normalized by 
contemporaneous year income, and capital gains in 1997 are normalized by 1998 income due to the 
lack of 1997 income data.  
 












Maximum 20%  127.60%  61,935.15  7.87 
99
th percentile  9%  81.50%  31,923.33  1.20 
90
th percentile  2%  25.61%  11,266.21  0.31 
75
th percentile  0%  17.63%  5,223.65  0.13 
50
th percentile  0%  9.90%  2,264.68  0.04 
25
th percentile  0%  5.48%  698.30  0.01 
10
th percentile  0%  -5.47%  1.91  -0.08 
1
st percentile  -9%  -26.93%  0.03  -0.56 
Minimum -20%  -82.64%  0.03  -8.49 
        
Mean 0.30%  11.88%  4,418.88  0.09 
Std. deviation  2.47%  16.87%  6,306.86  0.30 
  Table III. Regressions of Contribution Rate Changes on Portfolio Returns and Variance 
This table presents coefficients from estimating regression equation (4). The dependent variable is the 
year-over-year change in the contribution rate effective during the last pay cycle of December. The ∆ 
operator is for year-over-year changes. The subscript i indexes investors, and t indexes years. Ri,t is 
annual 401(k) percent return, σ
2(Ri,t) is annualized 401(k) return variance, CapitalGaini,t is the 401(k) 
dollar capital gain, Yi,t is annual salary, and Tenurei,t is the number of years since original hire at the 
end of year t. The last three table rows indicate whether the regression includes company × year 
dummies, asset class (equities, bonds, or cash) balances at the prior year-end interacted with year 
dummies, and the share of the 401(k) in equities or bonds interacted with year dummies. Standard 
errors, clustered by company × employee’s state of residence in 1998, are in parentheses below the 
point estimates. 
 
∆Ri,t  0.0078** 0.0078** 0.0083** 0.0071** 
  (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0022) 
∆Ri,t–1  0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0010 -0.0010 
  (0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
∆σ
2(Ri,t)/1000  -0.0288** -0.0288** -0.0301** -0.0259** 
  (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0068) (0.0065) 
∆σ
2(Ri,t–1)/1000  -0.0269** -0.0267** -0.0311*  -0.0275* 
  (0.0100) (0.0101) (0.0125) (0.0118) 
∆(CapitalGaini,t/Yi,t)   0.0207  -0.2442*  -0.1848 
   (0.0792)  (0.0992)  (0.0991) 
∆(CapitalGaini,t–1/Yi,t)   0.1837  0.5439  0.5731 
   (0.2165)  (0.2959)  (0.2944) 
∆Log(Tenurei,t)  -1.1662 -1.2709 -1.0890 -1.2208 
  (0.9470) (0.9964) (0.9755) (0.9942) 
Company × Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Balance × Year controls  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Share × Year controls  No  No  No  Yes 
* Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. 
 Table IV. Regressions of Contribution Rate Changes on  
Portfolio Returns and Variance Interacted With Age and Income 
This table presents coefficients from estimating a variant of the regression equation (4). The dependent 
variable is the year-over-year change in the contribution rate effective during the last pay cycle of 
December. The ∆ operator is for year-over-year changes. The subscript i indexes investors, and t 
indexes years. Ri,t is annual 401(k) percent return, Agei,1998 is age at year-end 1998, Yi,1998 is 1998 
salary, and σ
2(Ri,t) is annualized 401(k) return variance. All regressions control for contemporaneous 
and lagged 401(k) dollar capital gains normalized by annual income (CapitalGain/Y), tenure at 
company, company × year dummies, asset class (equities, bonds, or cash) balances at the prior year-
end interacted with year dummies, and the share of the 401(k) in equities or bonds interacted with year 
dummies. Standard errors, clustered by company × employee’s state of residence in 1998, are in 
parentheses below the point estimates. 
 
∆R,t  0.0059** 0.0071** 0.0059** 
  (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
(∆Ri,t) ×Agei,1998/10  -0.0024   -0.0023 
 (0.0014)    (0.0014) 
(∆Ri,t) × log(Yi,1998)   -0.0007  -0.0010 
   (0.0027)  (0.0028) 
∆Ri,t–1  -0.0016 -0.0020 -0.0026 
  (0.0025) (0.0030) (0.0027) 
(∆Ri,t–1) ×Agei,1998/10  -0.0005   -0.0003 
 (0.0040)    (0.0041) 
(∆Ri,t–1) × log(Yi,1998)   -0.0117  -0.0122 
   (0.0072)  (0.0077) 
∆σ
2(Ri,t)/1000  -0.0224** -0.0255** -0.0221** 
  (0.0055) (0.0066) (0.0057) 
(∆σ
2(Ri,t)/1000) ×Agei,1998/10  0.0196**   0.0200** 
  (0.0040)   (0.0042) 
(∆σ
2(Ri,t)/1000) × log(Yi,1998)   0.0005  -0.0020 
   (0.0100)  (0.0111) 
∆σ
2(Ri,t–1)/1000  -0.0253* -0.0271* -0.0248* 
  (0.0111) (0.0117) (0.0111) 
(∆σ
2(Ri,t–1)/1000) × Agei,1998/10  0.0229**   0.0230** 
  (0.0059)   (0.0059) 
(∆σ
2(Ri,t–1)/1000) × log(Yi,1998)   0.0175  0.0150 
   (0.0132)  (0.0138) 
CapitalGain/Y  controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Tenure  controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Company × Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Balance × Year controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Share × Year controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
* Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level.  Table V. 401(k) Return Performance Persistence 
This table shows the results of regressing year t 401(k) portfolio alpha on year t – 1 401(k) portfolio 
alpha, where t goes from 1998 to 2000. The 3-factor alpha controls for the market return, size effect, 
and book-to-market effect. The 4-factor alpha also controls for stock price momentum. The last row 
indicates whether the regression includes company × year dummies. Standard errors, clustered by 
company × year × employee’s state of residence in year t, are in parentheses below the point estimates. 
 
  3-factor alpha  3-factor alpha  4-factor alpha  4-factor alpha 
αt–1  -0.4226** -0.1722**  -0.1070  0.0213 
 (0.0678)  (0.0520)  (0.0784)  (0.0614) 
Constant 0.1495  --  0.3849**  -- 
 (0.1104)    (0.0994)   
Company × Year 
dummies 
No Yes  No  Yes 
 